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SCHREMS’S SLIPPERY SLOPE:  
STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
TO REHABILITATE EU-U.S. CROSS-BORDER 
DATA TRANSFERS AFTER SCHREMS II 
Edward W. McLaughlin* 
 
In July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
invalidated the Privacy Shield Framework, the central data governance 
mechanism that once governed cross-border data transfers from the 
European Union (EU) to the United States.  For the second time in five years, 
Europe’s top court invalidated the primary method of cross-border data 
transfers.  Both times the CJEU found that the United States’s surveillance 
laws were, and remain, overbroad and fail to provide EU citizens with 
protections that are essentially equivalent to those guaranteed under the 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in light of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
As a result, more than 5400 companies that utilized the Privacy Shield 
Framework are now scrambling to implement new mechanisms to govern 
their data transfers along with what they hope are effective supplementary 
technical, operational, or contractual measures to achieve an essentially 
equivalent level of protection for their cross-border data transfers from the 
EU to the United States. 
Currently, there exists minimal guidance about how companies may satisfy 
the GDPR’s requirements.  Even if the United States and the EU negotiate 
and implement a “Privacy Shield 2.0” in the near future, a new framework 
is unlikely to remedy some of the faults the CJEU has consistently identified 
in U.S. surveillance law.  This Note argues that a combination of private-law 
enhancements, contractual and technical, along with minor modifications to 
the administrative and judicial oversight of U.S. intelligence agencies, is 
required to create a sound and stable framework that achieves the needs of 
EU individuals’ privacy rights and still enables the United States to exercise 
legitimate foreign surveillance in the interest of national security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As part of the modern, digital, and international economy, companies of 
all sizes transfer the personal information of their users or customers across 
international borders as part of their normal business operations.1  Naturally, 
such transfers are subject to the laws and regulations of the respective 
jurisdictions in which the transfers transpire. 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) permits the transfer of 
European Union (EU) subjects’ data from the EU to third-party (“non-EU”) 
countries only if the transfers utilize certain approved transfer mechanisms.2  
The mechanisms are acceptable under European law so long as the data 
protections in those non-EU countries are “essentially equivalent” to those of 
the EU.3 
The EU and the U.S. Department of Commerce created the Privacy Shield 
Framework (“Privacy Shield”) as an approved transfer mechanism to 
facilitate efficient data transfers to the United States based on the GDPR’s 
mandate.4  The Privacy Shield is a series of data privacy and security 
principles that U.S. companies agree to abide by in processing or transferring 
personal information between the EU and the United States.5  The EU 
determined the Privacy Shield provided adequate safeguards and protection 
for EU data subjects that was consistent with the requirements under 
European law.6  Therefore, by self-certifying and remaining compliant with 
the Privacy Shield, U.S. companies were able to execute their relevant 
business in the EU. 
Then, in July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
the EU’s highest court, held that U.S. protections for individual data rights 
under the Privacy Shield were inadequate,7 in part because of U.S. 
authorities’ broad ability to access the data.8  As a result, EU and U.S. 
 
 1. Before the Privacy Shield was declared invalid in July 2020, more than 5400 
companies, 70 percent of which were small- and medium-sized enterprises, used the Privacy 
Shield for their EU-U.S. cross-border data transfers. The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy 
Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data Flows:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., 
Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. 5–6 (Dec. 9, 2020) (testimony of James M. Sullivan, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/8F72849E-3625-4687-B8F5-
71AFF4640D1F [https://perma.cc/99VY-MY47]. 
 2. See generally Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 3. Id. recital 104. 
 4. See id. recital 108. 
 5. See Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the 
Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 48 (EU) [hereinafter 
Privacy Shield Decision]. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems 
(Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201 (July 16, 2020). 
 8. See id. ¶ 180 (holding that U.S. law supporting the Privacy Shield does not impose 
limitations on the power of U.S. authorities to implement certain surveillance programs and, 
therefore, cannot ensure a level of protection “essentially equivalent” to that in the EU under 
the GDPR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights). 
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companies can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield for their cross-border 
transfer needs.9  The decision caused immediate problems for more than 5400 
companies that relied on the Privacy Shield10 because it did not allow for any 
grace period during which firms could continue to be protected by the 
practice while a new solution was created.11 
In Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and Maximillian 
Schrems12 (Schrems II), the CJEU rendered its decision in two parts.  First, 
it upheld the validity of standard contractual clauses (SCC), a type of 
private-law solution, in principle.13  Second, however, the CJEU emphasized 
that data controllers and processors (the contracting companies or entities)14 
are still obligated to make sure adequate protections exist in the relevant 
third-party countries.15  The CJEU’s invalidation of the Privacy Shield 
applied specifically to the EU-U.S. framework.16  The SCC decision applies 
generally to the standard clauses used between companies in any third-party 
country and places the onus on the parties to determine the adequacy of 
protection in their respective countries or territories.17  However, the court’s 
assessment of U.S. law’s inadequate data protections—mainly that U.S. 
authorities are too broadly authorized to access and analyze data and that EU 
subjects lack adequate judicial redress against such abuse—means 
cross-border transfers to the United States using SCCs suffer the same 
inadequate protections in practice as those that relied on the now-defunct 
Privacy Shield.18 
The decision marks the second time in five years that the CJEU declared 
the primary EU-U.S. cross-border data transfer mechanism invalid.  The 
CJEU reached the same conclusion previously in 2015 in Maximillian 
 
 9. See id. ¶ 201. 
 10. See Press Release, Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary 
of Commerce Wilbur Ross Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. 
Data Flows (July 16, 2020), https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/index.php/news/press-
releases/2020/07/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and.html 
[https://perma.cc/MT3D-XJJE] [hereinafter Statement on Schrems II Ruling]. 
 11. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CASE C-311/18–DATA PROTECTION 
COMMISSIONER V FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD AND MAXIMILLIAN SCHREMS 2 (2020), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc31118_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/75TN-83M9]. 
 12. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems 
(Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020). 
 13. See id. ¶ 148. 
 14. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to understand that controllers and 
processors are the entities involved in the collection, storage, dissemination, or other 
processing of personal data and transfer of that data to recipients. See GDPR, supra note 2, 
art. 4(7)–(8).  In this context, a controller will typically be the EU-based data exporter and the 
processor will be the U.S.-based importer. See id.  However, a more detailed explanation and 
definition of the roles is in Article 4 of the GDPR. See id. 
 15. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 131. 
 16. See id. ¶ 199. 
 17. See id. ¶ 134. 
 18. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 11, at 2. 
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Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner19 (Schrems I).  Schrems I 
invalidated the Safe Harbor Framework, which had been the cross-border 
data transfer agreement in place between the United States and the EU since 
2000.20 
Both cases were the result of complaints initially brought by Austrian 
privacy activist, Maximillian Schrems, in response to Edward Snowden’s 
2013 public revelations about the scale and scope of some of the U.S. 
intelligence authorities’ surveillance programs.21  Schrems’s suits asserted 
that, based on those surveillance programs, the law and practice in the United 
States did not ensure “adequate protection” of his personal data.22  In both 
cases, the CJEU agreed and held that the United States does not ensure 
adequate protection of EU data subjects’ information.23 
This Note explores the implications of Schrems II, as well as the practical 
difficulties thousands of companies across the United States and Europe now 
face in the continuation of their business.  It examines the most compelling 
proposals to fix the immediate operational problem for companies engaged 
in cross-border data transfers, while also examining the need and advocating 
for practical adjustments to U.S. surveillance law that could provide much 
needed stability.  To adequately address the redress issues raised in Schrems 
II, this Note proposes technical and operational recommendations, like 
encryption and SCCs, as a partial solution, while advocating for more 
substantive, yet pragmatic, legislative change in the United States. 
Part I of this Note explores the landscape of governance mechanisms for 
cross-border data transfer under the GDPR.  In this context, it examines the 
EU’s principles and requirements, the mechanisms U.S. firms used to 
execute transfers in compliance, and the reasons the CJEU invalided the 
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield in Schrems II.  Part II examines the precarious 
situation in which the decision leaves technology companies and presents 
potential proposals for how the companies and the U.S. may adapt to the 
decision.  Part III advocates for pragmatic private-law solutions to enhance 
protections for data subjects and proposes a relatively narrow adjustment to 
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to 
allow for appropriate redress under certain circumstances.  Such a solution is 
most likely to adequately address the concerns articulated by the CJEU with 
minimal disruption to U.S. interests in foreign surveillance. 
 
 19. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015). 
 20. See Daniel Solove, Sunken Safe Harbor:  5 Implications of Schrems and US-EU Data 
Transfer, TEACHPRIVACY (Oct. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/sunken-safe-harbor-5-
implications-of-schrems-and-us-eu-data-transfer/ [https://perma.cc/ABB3-RQRV]. 
 21. See Press Release, Ct. of Just. of the European Union, The Court of Justice Declares 
That the Commission’s U.S. Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KSA-X6AV]; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55. 
 22. See Press Release, supra note 21; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55. 
 23. See Press Release, supra note 21; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55. 
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I.  PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION AND THE U.S. 
SURVEILLANCE LANDSCAPE 
To understand why the CJEU declared the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield to be 
inadequate under the GDPR’s requirements, it is necessary to understand 
what those requirements are and how they relate to some basic provisions of 
the U.S. legal surveillance apparatus.  This part will first describe the GDPR 
provisions that are relevant to cross-border data transfers and then explain 
why the CJEU determined U.S. laws do not meet the GDPR’s requirements 
under EU law.  Part I.A describes Europe’s relevant fundamental principles 
and requirements for acceptable cross-border data transfer mechanisms under 
the GDPR.  Part I.B discusses the relevant U.S. surveillance laws.  Part I.C 
explains the Schrems II court’s reasoning that the Privacy Shield does not 
satisfy the tension between U.S. surveillance laws and European data 
subjects’ privacy rights and thus fails to meet the GDPR’s requirements. 
A.  GDPR Data Requirements 
The European Parliament enacted the GDPR in 2016 to account for the 
transformation of society and the economy through technological 
development and globalization, while ensuring a high level of personal data 
protection.24  The GDPR permits cross-border data transfers only when those 
transfers are:  (1) executed in accordance with an adequacy decision,25 (2) 
implemented with other appropriate safeguards,26 or (3) deemed necessary 
or as satisfying other circumstances to derogate from the approved 
mechanisms.27 
Part I.A.1 outlines the GDPR’s protections and the foundational European 
data protection principles on which the GDPR operates.  Part I.A.2 explains 
the adequacy decision requirement and the European Commission’s 
conclusion that the Privacy Shield met those requirements.  Part I.A.3 
examines acceptable mechanisms in the absence of an adequacy decision.  
Part I.A.4 explores the parameters that allow cross-border transfers without 
a prior European Commission decision. 
1.  An Overview of the GDPR and the EU’s Foundational Principles  
The GDPR provides data protections for subjects in the EU and the 
European Economic Area (EEA).28  These protections include prohibiting 
 
 24. See GDPR, supra note 2, recital 6. 
 25. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 26. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 27. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 28. The EEA refers to the EU member states, plus three additional European nations 
(Norway, Lichtenstein, and Iceland) that are within the economic sphere. See Agreement 
Between the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an EEA Financial 
Mechanism 2014–2021, 2016 O.J. (L 141) 3.  Under the EEA Agreement, EU legislation 
relating to the movement of goods, services, persons, and capital are applicable to the EU 
member states, as well as these three EEA nations. See id. 
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the transfer of personal data outside of the EEA, unless certain conditions 
providing appropriate protections are met.29 
The protections are built on fundamental rights recognized by Europe in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”),30 
which the Treaty of Lisbon31 made legally binding on the EU in 2009.32  The 
Charter contains rights pertaining to:  dignity,33 freedoms,34 equality,35 
solidarity,36 citizens’ rights,37 and justice.38 
Most relevant to this Note (and the CJEU’s Schrems II analysis) are the 
privacy rights under Articles 7 and 8, as well as the right to effective judicial 
redress in Article 47.39  Article 7 articulates a broad respect for private and 
family life, stating “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications.”40  Article 8 protects privacy 
with respect to one’s personal data, stating “[e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning him or her” and that “[s]uch data must 
be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent . . . or 
some other legitimate basis.”41  Article 47 expressly provides for the right to 
a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal” for anyone whose rights and freedoms are violated.42 
In addition, Article 52 states that any legal limitations placed on the rights 
and freedoms found in the Charter must, “[s]ubject to the principle of 
proportionality, . . . be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest.”43  Taken together, the Charter enshrines EU 
subjects’ substantive and procedural rights, which may be limited for 
legitimate purposes, so long as those limitations “do not go beyond what is 
 
 29. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 4450. 
 30. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391. 
 31. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 32. Why Do We Need the Charter?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-
development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-
rights/why-do-we-need-charter_en [https://perma.cc/R364-NQFL] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
 33. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 396. 
 34. See id. at 397.  
 35. See id. at 399. 
 36. See id. at 401. 
 37. See id. at 403. 
 38. See id. at 405. 
 39. Id. art. 7, 8, 47. 
 40. Id. art. 7. 
 41. Id. art. 8. 
 42. Id. art. 47. 
 43. Id. art. 52(1). 
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necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.”44  These principles are 
part of the cultural and legal foundation on which the GDPR was built.45 
The GDPR applies to any processing of EU subjects’ personal data even 
if the controller or processor is located outside of the EU.46  Therefore 
U.S.-based companies involved in the processing of EU subjects’ data are 
governed by the GDPR’s regulation.47  This means U.S.-based companies 
are also subject to very large penalties for violations arising from improper 
cross-border data transfers.  These penalties may amount to twenty million 
euros or up to 4 percent of a company’s total worldwide revenue, whichever 
is greater.48 
Enforcement of the GDPR falls primarily on the independent supervisory 
authorities, or Data Protection Authorities (DPA) of each of the member 
states.49  However, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), consisting 
of the heads of each of the DPAs, is the EU body in charge of enforcing the 
GDPR.50  The EDPB issues enforcement guidelines, as well as binding rules, 
that facilitate consistency across the EU.51 
The GDPR encourages stable and predictable mechanisms for data 
transfers like official adequacy decisions,52 while also accepting SCCs, 
binding corporate rules, and other appropriate safeguards that may be 
sufficient in the absence of an adequacy decision.53  The law also permits 
 
 44. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS 02/2020 ON THE EUROPEAN 
ESSENTIAL GUARANTEES FOR SURVEILLANCE MEASURES 4 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/ 
edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_recommendations_202002_europeanessentialguaranteessurveillan
ce_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8SH-VR5M].  While the EU member states themselves 
determine what is “necessary and proportionate” in the context of their own national security 
concerns, the CJEU determines what that means in the foreign context—in this case, as it 
applies to U.S. surveillance law. See Robert D. Williams, To Enhance Data Security, Federal 
Privacy Legislation Is Just a Start, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
techstream/to-enhance-data-security-federal-privacy-legislation-is-just-a-start/ 
[https://perma.cc/T53Y-QCTY].  Any discussion of hypocrisy or “dissonance between what 
the EU is expecting of other governments and what it is able to ask of its member states” is 
beyond the scope of this Note. Joshua P. Meltzer, The Court of Justice of the European Union 
in Schrems II:  The Impact of GDPR on Data Flows and National Security, BROOKINGS (Aug. 
5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-in-
schrems-ii-the-impact-of-gdpr-on-data-flows-and-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/S3GC-
X5BM].  Instead, this Note intends to identify a clear and effective path forward for EU-U.S. 
cross-border data transfers based on the CJEU’s binding decision in Schrems II without 
evaluating the validity of the decision. 
 45. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 395. 
 46. GDPR, supra note 2, art. 3. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. art. 83(5). 
 49. See generally id. ch. VI (outlining the independence, tasks, and powers of the 
supervisory authorities to monitor and enforce the GDPR). 
 50. See id. art. 63–76. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. art. 45.  For a discussion on adequacy decisions, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 53. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 46. 
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derogations in certain circumstances54 and allows for some transfers out of 
necessity or with the data subjects’ explicit consent.55 
2.  The Process of and Requirement for Adequacy Decisions 
Article 45 of the GDPR permits cross-border data transfers that are 
executed pursuant to an “adequacy decision,”56 the mechanism by which the 
Privacy Shield was approved.57  An adequacy decision is a determination by 
the European Commission (“the Commission”), implemented by an act,58 
that a specific non-EU country, or specified entities or sectors within that 
country, provide adequate protection in accordance with the EU’s protection 
principles.59  If cross-border transfers are executed within the parameters of 
an adequacy decision, the transferring parties do not need to receive specific 
case-by-case authorization of the transfers by the appropriate member state’s 
DPA.60 
The Commission considers a number of factors when it assesses the 
adequacy of a third-party country’s protections.61  It considers “the rule of 
law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, 
both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, 
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to 
personal data.”62  The Commission also contemplates the “existence and 
effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory authorities in 
the third country or to which an international organisation is subject”63 and 
any commitments the third-party country or organization has entered into 
“arising from legally binding conventions or instruments.”64 
3.  “Appropriate Safeguards” in the Absence of an Adequacy Decision 
Although the Privacy Shield was a preferred and efficient mechanism 
because of its official adequacy status, the GDPR also supports other 
legitimate mechanisms that permit cross-border transfers even to third-party 
countries or territories with inadequate protections not qualifying for an 
adequacy decision.  Article 46 of the GDPR outlines several private-law 
safeguards or governance methods that could be used to authorize 
 
 54. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 55. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 49. 
 56. See id. art. 45. 
 57. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 58. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 45(3). 
 59. See id. art. 45(1). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. art. 45(2). 
 62. Id. art. 45(2)(a). 
 63. Id. art. 45(2)(b). 
 64. Id. art. 45(2)(c). 
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cross-border data transfers absent a Commission adequacy decision.65  These 
include standard data protection clauses, which are also called SCCs.66 
In 2010, the Commission approved twelve of these SCCs in its “SCC 
Decision.”67  The effect of the decision was that private controllers and 
processors would be allowed to “cut and paste” those SCCs into their 
individual contracts, thereby imposing approved data protection obligations 
on the parties when transferring data to third-party countries.68  The SCC 
Decision was enacted prior to the introduction of the GDPR’s enhanced 
protection language, and it was meant to address data transfers to third-party 
countries that did not provide an adequate level of protection.69  Following 
the Schrems II decision, the Commission, to replace the outdated SCCs, 
enacted updated SCCs that incorporate a wider range of data transfer and 
processing activity consistent with the GDPR.70  SCCs remain valid in 
principle following Schrems II, but it is not clear how practically valid they 
remain after the CJEU’s reasoning for the invalidation of the Privacy 
Shield.71 
 
 65. See id. art. 46(1). 
 66. See id. art. 46(2)(c)–(d).  Article 46 also permits other transfer tools such as binding 
corporate rules (BCR), see id. art. 46(2)(b), codes of conduct, see id. art. 46(2)(e), certification 
mechanisms, see id. art. 46(2)(f), or ad hoc contractual clauses, see id. art. 46(2)(a).  All of the 
tools available under Article 46 are contractual in nature.  Because SCCs were the focus of 
the CJEU’s Schrems II decision and because the CJEU and EDPB require exporters to conduct 
the same analysis of the third-party country’s legislation for any of the mechanisms under 
Article 46, this Note focuses on SCCs specifically, but it would be appropriate to apply the 
same reasoning to any of these other tools under Article 46. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., 
RECOMMENDATIONS 01/2020 ON MEASURES THAT SUPPLEMENT TRANSFER TOOLS TO ENSURE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA, ¶¶ 23–24 (2d ed. 2021). 
 67. Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the 
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5 [hereinafter SCC 
Decision]. 
 68. See id. recital 7.  For example, clause 12 outlines the “Obligation after the termination 
of personal data-processing services” as: 
The parties agree that on the termination of the provision of data-processing 
services, the data importer and the sub-processor shall, at the choice of the data 
exporter, return all the personal data transferred and the copies thereof to the data 
exporter or shall destroy all the personal data and certify to the data exporter that it 
has done so, unless legislation imposed upon the data importer prevents it from 
returning or destroying all or part of the personal data transferred.  In that case, the 
data importer warrants that it will guarantee the confidentiality of the personal data 
transferred and will not actively process the personal data transferred anymore. 
Id. cl. 12. 
 69. See id. at 5–6, recitals 7–8; see also Daniel Solove, The Impact of the Schrems II 
Decision:  An Interview with Wim Nauwelaerts, TEACHPRIVACY (Sep. 9, 2020), 
https://teachprivacy.com/the-impact-of-the-schrems-ii-decision-an-interview-with-wim-
nauwelaerts/ [https://perma.cc/J9BP-GYBH] (explaining SCCs and BCRs were designed for 
the purpose of transferring data to “recipients in countries where the (privacy) laws do not 
ensure an adequate level of protection”). 
 70. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021 on Standard 
Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries Pursuant to 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2021 O.J. (L 199) 
31. 
 71. See infra Part I.C.3. 
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If parties utilize Article 46 SCCs, personal data may be transferred to a 
third-party country because those SCCs are the “appropriate safeguards” 
implemented by the contracting parties,72 so long as the data subjects have 
“enforceable” rights and “effective legal remedies.”73  The mechanisms 
under Article 46, therefore, may provide an avenue for controllers and 
processors to engage in safe transfers of data to third-party countries—even 
when the Commission has not implemented an adequacy decision or when 
the parties are not a part of an approved adequacy decision framework.74 
4.  “Necessity” and Other Derogations for Certain Circumstances 
Lastly, the GDPR carves out a number of instances in which data transfers 
may be permitted even without the protective safeguards outlined in Articles 
45 and 46.  These exceptions are known as “derogations.”75  The principal 
carve-outs most relevant to this Note are the provisions permitting transfer 
(1) when the data subject has explicitly consented to the transfer after being 
informed of the potential risks76 and (2) if it is necessary to execute a contract 
between the data controller and data subject or if it is in the interest of the 
data subject.77 
The Article 49 derogations are exemptions to the GDPR’s central objective 
to ensure that personal data is only transferred to third-party countries if there 
is an adequate level of protection.78  Thus, under a valid derogation, personal 
data may be transferred even where protections are inadequate.  Because of 
this possibility, the EDPB advised that the derogations “must be interpreted 
restrictively so that the exception does not become the rule.”79  So, while the 
CJEU may have indicated some allowances under this provision,80 which 
may provide the solution to companies following the Schrems II decision, the 
EDPB has reiterated the “exceptional nature” of Article 49 and asserted that 
the derogations must continue to be interpreted restrictively81 and applied 
only to transfers that are “occasional and not repetitive.”82 
 
 72. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 46(2)(c). 
 73. Id. art. 46(1). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. art. 49. 
 76. See id. art. 49(1)(a). 
 77. See id. art. 49(1)(b)–(c).  Data transfers are also permitted for the public interest, see 
id. art. 49(1)(d),(g), as part of a legal claim, see id. art. 49(1)(e), and when it is necessary to 
protect the subject’s vital interest but the subject is unable to give consent, see id. art. 49(1)(f). 
 78. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 2/2018 ON DEROGATIONS OF ARTICLE 49 
UNDER REGULATION 2016/679, at 4 (2018). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 202 (July 16, 2020) (holding 
that a “legal vacuum” was unlikely to result from the court’s decision because of the 
parameters outlined in Article 49); see infra Part II.B.3. 
 81. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 13. 
 82. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 78, at 4. 
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B.  Relevant U.S. Surveillance Law 
The CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance law83 in Schrems II focuses on 
three pieces of law that are most relevant to cross-border data transfers:  (1) 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),84 (2) 
Executive Order 12333 (“EO 12333”),85 and (3) Presidential Policy Directive 
28 (PPD-28).86  A basic overview of the powers the intelligence community 
derives from these laws is helpful for understanding why the CJEU 
determined that the United States does not currently afford essentially 
equivalent protection to EU subjects. 
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to “to authorize and regulate certain 
governmental electronic surveillance of communications for foreign 
intelligence purposes.”87  The statute created a process for the government to 
obtain “ex parte judicial orders authorizing domestic electronic surveillance 
upon a showing that, inter alia, the target of the surveillance was a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.”88  FISA also created the FISC, which 
is comprised of Article III district court judges who “hear applications for 
and grant orders approving electronic surveillance.”89 
FISA requires the government to obtain warrants or court orders for certain 
foreign surveillance activity.90  The act also created the FISC so that the 
independent judiciary could review those requests and grant the orders when 
appropriate.91  Such orders can direct electronic communications service 
providers to provide the public authority with access to the data that the 
provider has.92 
FISA also requires the U.S. Attorney General to adopt “specific 
minimization procedures governing the retention and dissemination by the 
[government] of [information] received . . . in response to an order.”93  These 
procedures include strictly securing the data using secure networks and 
restricting use of that data only for the purposes approved by the court 
order.94  Programs authorized under FISA are subject to oversight by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the FISC, and Congress, as well as to audits and 
program reviews by the intelligence agencies’ own internal privacy and civil 
liberties officers.95 
 
 83. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 84. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. 
 85. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 86. Press Release, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 
2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-
policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [https://perma.cc/UJM8-FRT3] [hereinafter 
Presidential Policy Directive]. 
 87. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013). 
 88. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 89. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1). 
 90. Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1). 
 94. See Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797–98 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 95. See id. 
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EO 12333 does not compel companies involved in cross-border data 
transfers to provide U.S. public authorities with that data; however, it does 
permit U.S. public authorities to collect data extraterritorially, meaning data 
can be intercepted while in transit prior to arriving in the United States.96  As 
they relate to surveillance programs relevant to this Note, activities 
conducted under EO 12333 are not governed by statute,97 nor are they subject 
to judicial oversight.98 
In 2014, the implementation of PPD-28 extended some protections of 
FISA and EO 12333 to non-U.S. persons.99  PPD-28 states that intelligence 
activities should be “as tailored as feasible.”100  While the directive is binding 
on the intelligence community, it does not provide parameters or oversight 
mechanisms to enforce the tailoring of those intelligence activities.101 
The existing oversight mechanisms that do cover parts of these laws are 
meant to hold the intelligence community accountable for its programs, but 
they do not allow individuals to challenge the public authorities’ actions.102  
Only the recipient of an order to disclose data under FISA has the “right [to] 
judicial review of the order before the FISC.”103  However, that recipient 
must also keep the order a secret; recipients cannot disclose to anyone, 
including the subject of the data, their receipt of such an order.104  Congress 
did not imagine that third parties, such as the subjects of the collected data, 
would ever know about the existence of the court orders, much less challenge 
their legality under the statute because of the deliberately secret nature of 
surveillance and the prohibition on disclosure.105 
In a 2013 case concerning surveillance of U.S. persons that emerged in 
light of the Snowden revelations,106 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to 
 
 96. An example of interception while in transit would be capturing the data directly from 
underwater cables on the floor of the Atlantic Ocean, a tactic U.S. authorities employ under 
EO 12333. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 63 (Jul. 16, 2020). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. ¶ 65. 
 99. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 86, § 4. 
 100. See id. § 1. 
 101. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181. 
 102. See supra text accompanying note 95; Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797–
98 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 103. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 104. See id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) (stating that the recipient of an order to 
produce data may not “disclose to any other person that the [public authority] has sought or 
obtained” an order). 
 105. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-174, at 128, 268 (2005). 
 106. In 2013, Edward Snowden made classified NSA materials public, which led to more 
than 120 revelations about secret U.S. government surveillance programs. Snowden 
Revelations, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations [https://perma.cc/ 
Z2LM-M42J] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (cataloging all revelations that emerged from 
Snowden’s disclosure to date).  Among the most significant were the PRISM and 
UPSTREAM data collection programs, which were conducted according to FISA Section 702 
and EO 12333 and which were the subject of much of the CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance 
law in Schrems II. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 61, 165, 179 
(July 16, 2020); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), 
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establish standing, “an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a 
favorable ruling.’”107  Further, the Court “reiterated that ‘threatened injury 
must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that 
‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”108  As it pertains 
to the questions presented in Schrems II, if EU data subjects do not know that 
their data has been improperly collected and, therefore, cannot show injury, 
then they will usually lack standing to challenge any action of the U.S. public 
authorities under FISA.109 
To try to remedy this redress deficiency, the United States expanded the 
oversight role under PPD-28 to create an ombudsperson mechanism.  The 
ombudsperson is a U.S. Department of State senior coordinator—at the level 
of under-secretary—who receives and addresses concerns about U.S. signals 
received by intelligence from foreign governments and who utilizes 
compliance review mechanisms under U.S. law to ensure proper remedies 
are granted.110  But the response to complaints is limited and may only alert 
the individual that any noncompliance has been remedied, without more.111 
Overall, the surveillance infrastructure under these three laws permits the 
United States to collect the personal data of EU subjects in bulk without the 
knowledge of those data subjects,112 and it does not grant non-U.S. data 
subjects “actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities.”113 
C.  Schrems II Decision and Rationale 
Whether the third-party country’s protections are “essentially equivalent 
to that ensured within the Union” is the consistent lodestar the Commission 
should consider when assessing the adequacy of extraterritorial data 
protections under the GPDR.114  The law specifically highlights that the 
third-party country should have effective independent data protection 
supervision and that the data’s subjects should be afforded administrative and 
judicial redress for violations of their data protection rights.115  The CJEU 
emphasized these exact principles in its analysis of the Privacy Shield in 




 107. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
 108. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (alteration in original). 
 109. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 45 (July 16, 2020). 
 110. See Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5, recitals 116, 120. 
 111. See id. recital 120. 
 112. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 183. 
 113. Id. ¶ 181. 
 114. GDPR, supra note 2, recital 104. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181 (holding that U.S. law supporting the Privacy Shield 
does limit the power of U.S. authorities to implement certain surveillance programs and, 
therefore, cannot ensure a level of protection “essentially equivalent” to that in the EU under 
the Charter).  The Privacy Shield itself was a response to an earlier CJEU ruling in Case 
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declaration of the inadequacy of the Privacy Shield creates such a significant 
problem and vulnerability for companies that engage in cross-border data 
transfers from Europe to the United States, whether they used the Privacy 
Shield or the other mechanisms available, mainly SCCs. 
First, Part I.C.1 describes how the Commission initially determined the 
Privacy Shield to be adequate under the GDPR.  Part I.C.2 examines the 
CJEU’s rationale for declaring the Privacy Shield to be inadequate.  Part I.C.3 
then highlights questions that have arisen over whether other GDPR data 
transfer mechanisms, like SCCs, can be implemented given the CJEU’s 
conclusion that the U.S. government’s surveillance abilities violate GDPR 
requirements, which operate independently of the individual companies’ 
internal privacy and security policies. 
1.  The Commission’s Prior Adequacy Decision 
The Privacy Shield’s status as the preferred data transfer mechanism was 
secured via an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45 of the GDPR.117  The 
principles presented in the Privacy Shield were developed by the Department 
of Commerce in consultation with the Commission.118  The Privacy Shield 
consists of data privacy and security principles primarily concerned with 
notice, choice, security, subjects’ right to access, recourse, and other 
principles that the Commission determined met the GDPR’s requirements.119  
Upon self-certifying and committing to the principles and obligations of the 
Privacy Shield, participating companies were able to engage in cross-border 
data transfers based on a pre-authorized status120—a much more efficient 
process than case-by-case authorizations. 
In the Privacy Shield adequacy decision, the Commission emphasized that 
FISA provides some remedies that are available to non-U.S. persons.121  
However, the Privacy Shield decision also acknowledged that it may be 
difficult for non-U.S. individuals to establish the standing required to pursue 
those remedies in U.S. courts.122  To try to remedy this deficiency, PPD-28 
created an ombudsperson mechanism, as discussed in Part I.B.123 
Based on these assurances from the United States about compliance, the 
Commission determined that the United States ensured adequate data 
protection to organizations that were part of the Privacy Shield.124  The 
 
C-362/14, Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015), which declared the previous Safe 
Harbor Framework inadequate based on similar principles applicable under the pre-GDPR 
regulation. 
 117. See generally Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5. 
 118. See id. annex II. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. recitals 13–14. 
 121. See id. recital 112 (referring to the possibility of a civil cause of action for money 
damages against the United States or U.S. government officials in their personal capacities 
and challenging the legality of the surveillance in the event the United States plans to use the 
information gathered against the individual in proceedings in the United States). 
 122. See id. recital 115. 
 123. See id. recitals 116, 120. 
 124. See id. recital 136. 
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Commission also acknowledged that any interference with those protections 
by the U.S. public authorities for “national security, law enforcement or other 
public interest purposes” could be restricted to what was “strictly necessary” 
to achieve the legitimate public interest and could therefore be acceptable 
because of the aforementioned legal protections against such intrusions.125 
2.  CJEU’s Schrems II Finding of Inadequacy 
As discussed in Part I.B, the CJEU made its Schrems II determinations 
based on the same three U.S. legal instruments that the Commission 
considered when it initially made the Privacy Shield adequacy decision but 
arrived at the opposite conclusion.126 
The CJEU determined that the Commission’s adequacy decision127 was 
improper because the United States does not ensure a level of protection for 
personal data that is essentially equivalent to that of the EU on two 
grounds.128  First, U.S. surveillance laws are overbroad and do not meet the 
limited standards required under the GDPR and the principles of 
proportionality and necessity in the Charter.129  Second, data subjects lack 
access to appropriate redress via judicial or tribunal remedies in the United 
States, as is required under the GDPR in accordance with the Charter.130 
As the court highlighted with regard to its first point, and as the 
Commission acknowledged in its adequacy decision, Section 702 of FISA 
does not authorize individual surveillance.131  Instead, Section 702 authorizes 
entire programs, and the FISC only approves the programs based on their 
relation to the goal of acquiring foreign intelligence information—not on the 
basis of properly targeting foreign individuals.132  As such, FISA does not 
impose any limitations on the power it confers to execute broad surveillance 
or address any rights or remedies for non-U.S. persons potentially targeted 
by these broad surveillance powers.133  Since Section 702 does not limit its 
scope, it cannot satisfy the principle of proportionality134 and, therefore, 
cannot ensure a level of protection that is “essentially equivalent” with the 
EU’s.135 
Similarly, the court found that EO 12333 also “does not confer rights 
which are enforceable” against the United States in the courts136 because that 
particular legal basis for U.S. surveillance lacks any judicial redress 
 
 125. See id. recital 140. 
 126. See id. recitals 67–135; Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 178–84 
(July 16, 2020). 
 127. Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5. 
 128. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶¶ 180–81. 
 129. See id. ¶ 180. 
 130. See id. ¶ 181. 
 131. See id. ¶ 179. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. ¶ 180. 
 134. See id. ¶ 176; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 135. Id. ¶ 180. 
 136. Id. ¶ 182. 
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mechanism.137  Therefore, the CJEU concluded that these laws taken 
together with PPD-28 failed to provide the minimum safeguards that are 
required under EU law’s principle of proportionality because the surveillance 
programs authorized under them cannot be “limited to what is strictly 
necessary.”138  Because of this failure, the CJEU concluded that the 
surveillance programs cannot be “essentially equivalent” to those that are 
found under EU law.139 
The court maintained that, in assessing the possibility of individual 
remedies, the Commission relied too heavily on the parameters outlined in 
PPD-28, which limits intelligence activity to be “as tailored as feasible”140 
and specifically creates an ombudsperson within the role of the senior 
coordinator/undersecretary to liaise with foreign governments that may have 
concerns about U.S. “signals intelligence activities.”141  However, the 
creation of an ombudsperson under PPD-28 “does not grant data subjects 
actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities” and “cannot 
ensure a level of protection essentially equivalent to that arising from the 
Charter.”142  This is because Article 47 of the Charter establishes that anyone 
whose rights or freedoms are guaranteed by EU law has the right of an 
effective remedy via a hearing before an “independent and impartial 
tribunal.”143  The court determined that the ombudsperson did not meet this 
standard based on concerns about the ombudsperson’s independence.144  The 
court held that, because the ombudsperson is part of the U.S. State 
Department and is appointed by the U.S. Secretary of State, the subordinate 
relationship “undermine[s] the Ombudsman’s independence from the 
executive.”145 
In addition, the ombudsperson is not part of the independent judiciary.146  
Therefore, because of the lack of rights actionable in U.S. courts against U.S. 
authorities, data subjects did not have an effective remedy as required by EU 
law.147  For all these reasons, the CJEU concluded the Commission’s prior 
Privacy Shield decision to be invalid, nullifying the entire Privacy Shield.148 
3.  A Lingering Question Concerning the Validity of SCCs 
While the CJEU declared the Privacy Shield invalid, the court maintained 
the legitimacy of SCCs.149  The CJEU held that the SCC adequacy decision 
 
 137. See Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5, recital 115; Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 191. 
 138. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 184. 
 139. Id. ¶ 185. 
 140. Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 86, § 1(d). 
 141. Id. § 4(d). 
 142. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181. 
 143. Id. ¶ 186 (citing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) art. 47. 
 144. See id. ¶ 195. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. ¶ 197. 
 148. See id. ¶ 201. 
 149. See id. ¶¶ 131–32. 
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itself150 does not require an assessment of any specific third-party country’s 
data protection regime.151  Instead, that responsibility to assess the adequacy 
of a third-party country’s legal protections falls on controllers or processors 
involved in the transaction.152 
The Commission’s SCC decision contains an important footnote 
acknowledging that the recipient, or data importer, may have to comply with 
applicable national legislation that is “not in contradiction” with SCCs, so 
long as the national legislation does not go beyond what is “necessary in a 
democratic society . . . to safeguard national security.”153  The court left open 
the question of how exactly private data controllers and processors are to 
assess whether the legislation in the third-party country stops at what is 
“necessary in a democratic society.”154 
The court emphasized that SCCs, being inherently contractual, cannot bind 
public authorities in third-party countries because the authorities are not 
parties to the contract.155  Of course, then, adequate legal protections for data 
subjects in third-party countries cannot be enacted via SCCs in a private 
contract.156  Therefore, to ensure the level of protection required by the 
GDPR, controllers, processors, and data recipients may need to adopt 
“supplementary measures” as required to “ensure compliance with that level 
of protection.”157 
The court failed to elaborate on just what supplemental measures or 
additional safeguards private controllers could implement to ensure the 
appropriate level of data protection for European subjects.158  Part II of this 
Note examines some proposed safeguards.  However, without direction from 
the court, commentators note that it is unclear if any privately added 
safeguard can rectify the inadequacy of the data subject protections in the 
United States, particularly for the problem of a lack of a judicial remedy.159 
The CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance law under the Privacy Shield 
decision is equally applicable to the use of SCCs for firms transferring private 
 
 150. See generally SCC Decision, supra note 67. 
 151. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 130. 
 152. See id. ¶ 134. 
 153. SCC Decision, supra note 67, cl. 5 n.1. 
 154. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 141. 
 155. See id. ¶ 125. 
 156. See id. ¶ 132. 
 157. Id. ¶ 133. 
 158. See Christopher Kuner, The Schrems II Judgment of the Court of Justice and the 
Future of Data Transfer Regulation, EUROPEAN L. BLOG (July 17, 2020), 
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/07/17/the-schrems-ii-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-and-
the-future-of-data-transfer-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/CH3X-MZ8S] (noting the court 
suggested “using ‘supplementary measures’ . . . to protect data under the SCCs, but d[id] not 
explain what measures these could be” (quoting Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 133)). 
 159. See Jennifer Daskal, What Comes Next:  The Aftermath of European Court’s Blow to 
Transatlantic Data Transfers, JUST SEC. (July 17, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71485/ 
what-comes-next-the-aftermath-of-european-courts-blow-to-transatlantic-data-transfers/ 
[https://perma.cc/BA7S-TP25] (noting there is “nothing that companies can do to provide the 
kind of back-end judicial review that the Court demands”). 
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data to the United States.160  Therefore, one commentator notes that the court 
would hold that SCCs alone will not work for those transfers without 
additional provisions.161  This remains the case as the updated SCCs also 
require exporters to assess the third-party country’s surveillance laws and 
practices to determine what protections may be warranted.162  Then the 
question is:  What additional safeguards can data controllers and processors 
take, in practice, to ensure compliance with the level of protection mandated 
by EU law?163 
II.  PRACTICAL PATHS FORWARD IN THE POST-SCHREMS II LANDSCAPE 
In Schrems II, the CJEU declined to allow the Privacy Shield to remain in 
place while a new solution was developed.164  The court reasoned that a 
“legal vacuum” was unlikely in the wake of its decision because of the 
appropriate safeguards available under Articles 46 and 49 of the GDPR, 
which provide conditions defining when transfers may take place without an 
adequacy decision.165  However, without concrete assurance from European 
authorities about what additional appropriate safeguards will be considered 
acceptable in accordance with Article 46 or about how necessity or consent 
principles from Article 49 could be utilized for ongoing activity, thousands 
of companies are currently trying to navigate their way through this 
confusing legal landscape.166 
The questionable legitimacy of using SCCs to transfer data to the United 
States is especially troublesome because SCCs “were specifically designed 
to transfer personal data outside of the EEA, to recipients in countries where 
the (privacy) laws do not ensure an adequate level of protection.”167  As a 
result, companies and thought leaders are trying to find immediate practical 
solutions that will permit continued operations without business delays, as 
well as considering long-term structural reform to provide more stability and 
protection between the regions.168  Part II.A outlines the regulatory guidance 
 
 160. See Daniel Solove, Schrems II:  Reflections on the Decision and Next Steps, 
TEACHPRIVACY (July 23, 2020), https://teachprivacy.com/schrems-ii-reflections-on-the-
decision-and-next-steps/ [https://perma.cc/JYN3-F6XP] (noting that the “SCC don’t really 
survive, at least not for the US” after Schrems II and that “the SCC cannot work as a means to 
transfer EU personal data to the US without some kind of additional protections against US 
government surveillance”). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Kenneth Propp, Progress on Transatlantic Data Transfers?:  The Picture After 
the US-EU Summit, LAWFARE (June 25, 2021, 10:16 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
progress-transatlantic-data-transfers-picture-after-us-eu-summit [https://perma.cc/QJT3-
A4AK]. 
 163. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 137. 
 164. See id. ¶ 202. 
 165. Id.; see supra Parts I.A.3–4. 
 166. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10 (noting that more than 5300 
companies relied on the Privacy Shield). 
 167. Solove, supra note 69 (describing this transfer scenario as the “raison d’être!” for 
SCCs and BCRs). 
 168. See Nick Clegg, Securing the Long Term Stability of Cross-Border Data Flows, 
FACEBOOK (Sep. 9, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/securing-the-long-term-
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to date.  Parts II.B and II.C then explore the proposed solutions that data 
exporters and recipients are implementing. 
A.  The EU and U.S. Regulatory Response to Schrems II 
Immediately following the CJEU’s decision in Schrems II, the EDPB 
issued guidance that emphasized the holding and stated that it would provide 
more guidance in the future.169  In the interim, the EDPB did provide some 
basic guidance emphasizing the CJEU’s holding that in order to utilize SCCs 
to transfer data to the United States, the data exporters and importers must 
make independent assessments regarding the adequacy of the data protection 
provided by the SCCs and provide necessary supplementary measures.170  
The board emphasized that it was “looking further into what these 
supplementary measures could consist of and will provide more guidance,” 
but the board did not provide a timetable for that guidance.171  In June 2021, 
nearly a year after Schrems II was decided, the EDPB issued final 
recommendations to European exporters.172 
In the United States, the Department of Commerce issued guidance stating 
that while the Privacy Shield was invalid for the purposes of meeting GDPR 
standards, the obligations of the participants under the Privacy Shield were 
still intact.173  The Department of Commerce explained that part of the 
purpose of maintaining the obligations and enforcement of the Privacy Shield 
was to allow organizations to demonstrate their “serious commitment to 
 
stability-of-cross-border-data-flows/ [https://perma.cc/6XZY-ASRY]; Marc Zwillinger et al., 
Supplementing SCCs to Solve Surveillance Shortfalls, ZWILLGEN (June 10, 2021), 
https://www.zwillgen.com/international/supplementing-sccs-solve-surveillance-shortfalls/ 
[https://perma.cc/DDZ5-8777]. 
 169. Press Release, EDPS Statement Following the Court of Justice Ruling in Case 
C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximilian Schrems 
(“Schrems II”) (July 17, 2020), https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-
releases/2020/edps-statement-following-court-justice-ruling-case_en 
[https://perma.cc/99W2-L697]. 
 170. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 11, at 1, 3, 5. 
 171. Id. at 5. 
 172. See generally, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66.  The EDPB issued draft 
guidance in November 2020 and solicited comments from the public through December 21, 
2020, which were considered for the final recommendations that were published in June 2021. 
See Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures that Supplement Transfer Tools to Ensure 
Compliance with the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., 
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/documents/public-consultations/2020/ 
recommendations-012020-measures-supplement_en [https://perma.cc/XUB9-NPY2] (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2021).  The analysis in this Note is based on the June 2021 recommendations, 
as those recommendations are the most recent guidance available. See EDPB Adopts Final 
Version of Recommendations on Supplementary Measures, Letter to EU Institutions on the 
Privacy and Data Protection Aspects of a Possible Digital Euro, and Designates Three EDPB 
Members to the ETIAS Fundamental Rights Guidance Board, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD 
(June 21, 2021), https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2021/edpb-adopts-final-version-
recommendations-supplementary-measures-letter-eu_en [https://perma.cc/CG72-XNCZ]. 
 173. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10. 
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protect personal information” in a way that offers “meaningful privacy 
protections and recourse for EU individuals.”174 
The Department of Commerce and the Commission confirmed that the 
institutions have initiated discussions to explore the potential for an enhanced 
Privacy Shield to comply with the needs emphasized in Schrems II.175  
However, it remains unclear when such an agreement could happen.176  As 
Professor Daniel Solove highlights, based on the CJEU’s reasoning, any new 
framework would involve at least some changes to U.S. surveillance law to 
accommodate for the current deficiencies.177 
In addition, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and 
the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence jointly issued a white 
paper emphasizing that, for the vast majority of parties, U.S. intelligence 
authorities are not interested in the data they transfer or collect.178  The white 
paper provides an “up-to-date and contextualized discussion” of the relevant 
U.S. intelligence surveillance laws that companies relying on SCCs can use 
in their own assessments.179  That discussion provides support for companies 
to take a risk-based approach to their cross-border data transfers by 
articulating that the overwhelming majority of transfers are of no interest to 
the U.S. intelligence agencies and that most companies have never received 
an order for data under FISA 702.180 
In the final draft guidance, the EDPB may indicate openness to such a 
risk-based approach.181  The recommendations are meant to provide 
exporters with steps to follow to assess whether a third-party country’s laws 
may impinge on the data subjects’ rights,182 and if so, potential supplemental 
 
 174. FAQs–EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program Update, PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK (Mar. 31, 
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[https://perma.cc/46CQ-BVPE]. 
 175. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10. 
 176. See Propp, supra note 162 (highlighting the generic statements and the hope that there 
will be some agreement by the end of 2021). 
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RELEVANT TO SCCS AND OTHER EU LEGAL BASES FOR EU-U.S. DATA TRANSFERS AFTER 
SCHREMS II 1 (2020), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
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U.S. intelligence agencies would seek to collect data from transfers involving ordinary 
business activity like “employee, customer, or sales records” and adding that “[i]ndeed, the 
overwhelming majority of companies have never received orders to disclose data under FISA 
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 181. See Theodore Christakis, “Schrems III”?:  First Thoughts on the EDPB Post-Schrems 
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measures183 that they may choose to implement so that the protection is 
essentially equivalent to that of the EU.184 
In this guidance, the EDPB advises that if an exporter still wishes to 
proceed with a data transfer to a country lacking legislation clearly governing 
the circumstances in which public authorities may access the data, then those 
exporters may consider the “practices of the third country’s public 
authorities” to help determine if the safeguards will sufficiently protect the 
personal data transferred.185  Therefore, to inform what supplemental 
measures, if any, may be used, the EDPB appears to be amenable to an 
exporter’s assessment, considering not only the rights and laws that exist but 
also the discretion that the public authorities of the third-party country may 
exercise in enforcing the laws.186 
The EDPB’s guidance proposes supplemental measures that exporters and 
importers may choose to implement to establish essentially equivalent 
protections for data subjects.187  However, the guidance reiterates that it is 
exporters’ duty to perform an assessment of the protections in the third-party 
country and implement appropriate protections.188  The EDPB’s guidance is 
meant to clarify the process for European exporters,189 but it does not make 
any conclusions about which, if any, of the supplemental recommendations 
may be used to establish the required level of data protection for transfers 
from the EU to the United States.190 
The result is that the main regulatory authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic have made it very clear that the Privacy Shield is not valid for GDPR 
compliance, but the regulatory authorities lack a viable replacement solution.  
Without an official adequacy decision under Article 45, private entities must 
determine the level of protection in a third-party country and then determine 
and implement measures that they believe will provide essentially equivalent 
data protections. 
 
 183. See infra Part II.B. 
 184. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 3. 
 185. Id. ¶ 43. 
 186. See id. ¶ 43.3. 
 187. See generally id. 
 188. See id. at 3 (emphasizing the CJEU’s holding in Schrems II that “controllers or 
processors, acting as exporters, are responsible for verifying, on a case-by-case basis and, 
where appropriate, in collaboration with the importer in the third country, if the law or practice 
of the third country impinges on the effectiveness of the appropriate safeguards contained in 
the [GDPR transfer mechanism]”). 
 189. See id. (stating “[t]hese recommendations provide exporters with a series of steps to 
follow, potential sources of information, and some examples of supplementary measures that 
could be put in place”). 
 190. The EDPB’s guidance merely states that when identifying and implementing a 
supplemental measure, the exporter “may ultimately find that no supplementary measure can 
ensure an essentially equivalent level of protection for [the exporter’s] specific transfer,” 
thereby avoiding any conclusory holdings that any of the suggested recommendations may 
ensure adequate data protection. Id. at 4. 
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B.  Addressing the Reach of U.S. Surveillance 
Schrems II articulated that the existing surveillance systems in the United 
States do not allow European data subjects to enjoy protection that is 
essentially equivalent to that which is available in the EU.191  However, it 
also clearly articulated that private parties may be able to implement 
supplemental measures that, in practice, may provide adequate protection.192  
Yet, such private obligations do not bind the public authorities in the 
respective third-party country.193 
Because the regulatory bodies in the EU and United States are unable to 
quickly resolve the misalignment between fundamental rights in the EU and 
surveillance law in the United States, private entities are forced to find 
alternative bases or methods for transferring personal data from Europe to 
the United States to continue their operations with minimal interruption.  The 
technological enhancements, additional contractual provisions, or use of a 
different mechanism entirely in the EDPB’s draft recommendations, all 
utilize private law to attempt to avoid the overbroad reach of U.S. 
surveillance law and provide essentially equivalent protection, as required by 
the GDPR.194 
Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 consider, respectively, the technological and 
organizational changes that companies are implementing as legal solutions 
to mitigate risk of personal data being captured by U.S. intelligence agencies.  
Part II.B.3 assesses the utilization of consent and necessity derogation 
methods under Article 49 as a means to transfer data to the United States.  
Part II.B.4 explores contractual legal supplements that attempt to enhance 
compliance closer to the GDPR’s requirements. 
1.  Encryption 
Perhaps the most immediately actionable protection companies can take to 
enhance their SCCs is the utilization of robust encryption when personal data 
is transferred to U.S. firms.  Such technical measures can make accessing 
data more difficult, in practice, for public authorities in the United States.195  
Even if the authorities do access the data, tokenization could render the data 
meaningless to those other than the controller and recipient—and may be 
more helpful.196 
 
 191. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 192. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 133–34 (July 16, 2020). 
 193. See id. ¶¶ 125, 132. 
 194. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66. 
 195. See Solove, supra note 69. 
 196. See Ruth Boardman & Ariane Mole, Schrems II:  Privacy Shield Invalid, SCCs 
Survive.  What Happens Now?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2020, at 3, 6 (2020).  
Tokenization is the process of turning a piece of data into a random string of characters called 
a token that has no meaningful value if breached because there is no key that can be used to 
derive the original date, unlike encryption which uses a mathematical process to transform the 
sensitive information into the encrypted data. See Tokenization vs Encryption, MCAFEE, 
https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/security-awareness/cloud/tokenization-vs-
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These technical measures change the personal data such that it is useless 
if breached and so may be employed as a legal solution to provide effective 
protection against intelligence authorities’ ability to access the data.  The 
EDPB’s final recommendation provides guidance regarding technical 
measures, including data encryption or pseudonymization,197 and when they 
may or may not provide sufficient supplemental protection.198  According to 
that guidance, the potential suitability of technical measures hinges on 
whether the public authorities in third-party countries will be able to identify 
or know information about the specific data subjects.199  The EDPB’s 
recommendations are meant to be applicable200 whether the public authority 
in the third-party country accesses the data from the lines of communications 
themselves201 (similar to how U.S. authorities access data in accordance with 
EO 12333)202 or if the intended data importer is required to turn the data over 
to the authorities203 (similar to the obligations of electronic communications 
providers under Section 702 of FISA).204 
The EDPB outlined five use cases where the technical measures employed 
may provide adequate protection.205  In four of the five adequate scenarios, 
the technical measures are deemed adequate because the processor or 
importer in the third-party country has access to neither the unprotected data 
nor the keys needed to unprotect the data in order to perform its processing 
task.206  These four scenarios are:  (1) when an exporter stores encrypted data 
in the third-party country for backup or other purposes, but the importer does 
not need to access that data “in the clear” (i.e., unencrypted, not 
pseudonymized, decryption keys transported to the importer or a vulnerable 
party);207 (2) where pseudonymized data is transferred to the importer for 
analysis but without the information necessary to attribute the data to specific 
subjects;208 (3) when the data is accessible by public authorities while in 
transit;209 and (4) when the processing of the data is split or among multiple 
parties in different jurisdictions.210  In each of these scenarios neither the 
unencrypted or de-pseudonymized data nor the keys to unencrypt or 
 
encryption.html [https://perma.cc/X26H-HM7T] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).  The technical 
details of encryption and tokenization are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 197. Pseudonymization means the processing of personal data such that it can no longer be 
attributed to a specific data subject on its own without additional information, which is kept 
separately so the data is not attributable to an identifiable person. GDPR, supra note 2, art. 
4(5). 
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 202. See supra Part I.B. 
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 206. See id. 
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de-pseudonymize the data are accessible to the public authorities.  The fifth 
use case occurs when the data importer is specifically protected by the 
third-party country’s laws, such that the importer is protected from having to 
disclose the personal data to the public authorities.211  If that is the case, the 
importer may have the decryption key but must still make sure to use state of 
the art end-to-end encryption and/or pseudonymization so that the public 
authorities cannot access the sensitive data in transit.212 
Therefore, the EDPB determination of legal adequacy based on technical 
measures appears to be based primarily on the secured or unsecured nature 
of the data when in the third-party country.  If (1) the data is encrypted or 
pseudonymized prior to transfer, (2) the decryption keys are not transferred 
to the importer or any vulnerable party within the third-party country, and (3) 
the encryption is state-of-the-art such that the public authorities in the 
third-party country would not be able to determine any personal information 
about the protected data subjects, then the EDPB is likely to consider the 
technical action an effective supplemental measure, under the GDPR, that 
the exporter could contract for and implement to execute cross-border data 
transfers.213 
Conversely, if (1) the importer/processor in the third-party country 
requires access to the data “in the clear” in order to execute its task, (2) the 
laws of the third-party country that grant public authorities to the transferred 
data go “beyond what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic 
society,”214 and (3) the laws are applied in practice to the transfers in 
question, then the EDPB is “incapable of envisioning an effective technical 
measure to prevent that access from infringing on the data subject’s 
fundamental rights.”215  As the EDPB emphasizes, in scenarios where 
unencrypted personal data of EU data subjects are technically necessary for 
the importer to execute its tasks, any level of encryption will not be an 
effective supplementary measure capable of “ensur[ing] an essentially 
equivalent level of protection if the data importer is in possession of the 
cryptographic keys.”216 
Professor Theodore Christakis explains that the EDPB’s use cases from 
the earlier draft recommendations suggest that the transfers will be accepted 
“only if the data are rendered non-readable for the importer in the recipient 
country.”217  The EDPB’s explanation of two situations where technical 
measures would likely not be acceptable emphasizes the strict acceptability 
of technical measures alone.218  The first suggests that an exporter could not 
use a cloud service provider to process data in a third-party country, while 
the second considers that an exporter could not make personal data available 
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to parties in a third-party country, such as a “branch of the same company or 
subcontractors,” to be utilized for a shared business purpose.219  As Professor 
Omer Tene highlights, the lack of acceptability for these two scenarios may 
not solve the problem as much as they add to it because they “account[] for 
the vast majority of real world transfers.”220 
These analyses were conducted based on the draft recommendations, not 
the final recommendations published in June 2021.  The major development 
is that the EDPB’s final guidance permits exporters to consider how the law 
or authority impacts the transfer in practice as part of its assessment.221  That 
could lead those exporters to conclude that while the laws of the third country 
violate EEA principles, they do not affect this transfer in practice and the 
supplemental measures may thus be permissible.222 
Therefore, technical measures may constitute a supplementary measure 
that ensures the adequate level of protection as required by EU law under 
certain circumstances, but companies may have to bolster those 
supplementary measures with other mechanisms to reinforce the protections. 
2.  Data Localization 
Another potential solution is to avoid the transfers altogether by localizing 
data storage exclusively in Europe.223  If no data transfer occurs, then firms 
do not need to utilize an adequate mechanism; however, it has been suggested 
that, while the solution may appear to be adequate in the short term, this idea 
likely is not compatible with the global needs of firms who transfer data 
anyway.224 
One commentator, Professor Anupam Chander, explains that, practically 
speaking, localizing data fails to actually keep data local.225  Data transfers 
happen on such a large global scale because businesses operate on a global 
scale.226  Therefore, even if EU data is stored and maintained in Europe, 
customer service representatives based outside of the EU will still be able to 
access that data; similarly, if Facebook stores an EU subject’s profile on 
servers in Ireland, peers in the United States and elsewhere will still be able 
to access the profile.227  In addition, because the internet is international, an 
EU subject accessing EU-stored data may attain that access after being routed 
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through the United States, or elsewhere, so cross-border data transfers still 
occur.228  Jurisdictions could erect systems or firewalls to avoid such routing, 
but that would substantially increase costs for internet access generally, 
reducing the value of the service overall.229 
Second, there are legitimate questions about whether localization would 
align with the purpose of the Schrems II decision.  The court ruled that 
existing transfers to the United States were not permitted because U.S. 
surveillance law fails to provide adequate protection for EU subjects.230  But 
U.S. surveillance also occurs outside of the geographical boundaries of the 
United States and is less restrained abroad.231 
Despite these potential shortcomings, some companies started to use 
localization in the aftermath of the decision.232  For example, France’s health 
data hub has not only moved to data localization but also discontinued using 
Microsoft’s cloud service (which could still operate in the EU) to avoid being 
subject to U.S. surveillance law under Section 702 of FISA.233 
3.  Necessity or Consent 
In Schrems II, the CJEU indicated that Article 49 of the GDPR provides at 
least a short-term solution for companies that rely on the legitimacy of 
transferring personal data from Europe to the United States.234  The two 
potentially relevant avenues available under Article 49 are necessity or 
consent.235  Part II.B.3.a and Part II.B.3.b discuss necessity and consent as 
possible justifications for data transfers. 
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a.  Seeking Legitimacy by Necessity 
Since the Schrems II decision, Facebook has adopted the necessity 
approach after being notified by Ireland’s Data Protection Commission to 
stop using SCCs.236  In response to an inquiry from NOYB (a consumer 
privacy advocacy group initiated by Maximillian Schrems)237 about if and 
how Facebook transfers user data outside of the EU, Facebook said the legal 
basis for doing such transfers was that they were “necessary to provide 
[Facebook’s] contractual services.”238  Therefore, it appears that since the 
Schrems II decision, Facebook now relies on Article 49 of the GDPR as the 
legal basis for its cross-border data transfers, despite the fact that previous 
EDPB guidance stated that necessity cannot be used for systemic transfers, 
only “occasional” transfers.239  It is accepted, however, that actions like 
booking a flight or hotel in the United States or sending an email to the United 
States would be derogations for necessity.240  So then, Professor Chander 
questions whether communicating with peers in the United States via 
Facebook is a similar activity that could be justified by the same 
reasoning?241  That question remains unanswered, but Professor Chander 
emphasizes the EDPB’s guidance, which reiterates that Article 49 transfers, 
including necessity, are “narrowly construed.”242 
b.  Seeking Legitimacy by Consent 
Obtaining data subjects’ consent to transfer their data is the other avenue 
presented by Article 49 that seems viable for some businesses.  However, 
Professor Chander notes that the burden for consent is quite high under the 
GDPR.243  First, consent from the subject must be “specific, informed, and 
unambiguous.”244  The subject must also be able to withdraw her consent at 
any time.245  Second, the costs of acquiring such complete and adequate 
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consent from every applicable data subject will be quite high.246  Third, while 
there is some basis for the assertion that consent, unlike necessity, may be 
used for repeated, ongoing transfers,247 that theory has also been refuted by 
earlier EDPB direction248 and reiterated by subsequent EDPB guidance.249 
If either of these Article 49 derogations are acceptable, questions about the 
scope of their applicability are still open because they are likely to be more 
suitable for consumer-facing companies executing direct transactions with 
consumers, rather than any company that deals in cross-border data transfers. 
4.  Supplemental Clauses 
While the Schrems II court did not specify what “additional safeguards” 
companies could implement when they determine the protections of a 
third-party country are insufficient,250 some companies are providing 
supplemental contractual provisions (in addition to the new SCCs) that 
attempt to counter specific deficiencies.251  Indeed, the EDPB’s final June 
2021 recommendations assess a number of supplemental contractual 
provisions that may provide adequate supplemental measures,252 including 
transparency disclosure obligations,253 technical protections or procedural 
challenges,254 and opportunities to empower the data subjects to enforce their 
rights.255 
A core issue of Schrems II was the public authorities’ access to data.  Since 
the authorities are not bound by contractual terms, it is difficult to see how 
additional terms that only bind the contracting parties and not the authorities 
would be useful.256  Therefore, the EDPB advises that private contractual 
obligations would likely need to be combined with other technical or 
organizational solutions in order to be considered adequate measures.257  For 
example, additional contractual provisions will not rule out the possible 
application of FISA Section 702, which may oblige an electronic 
communications provider or importer in the United States to comply with 
orders to disclose data it receives to the public authorities.258  Because the 
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EDPB’s recommendations are for exporters assessing transfers to third-party 
countries generally and not specifically for data transfers moving from the 
EU to the United States,259 it is critical to determine if the recommendations 
can be utilized so that those transferring data to the United States can do so 
while providing data protection essentially equivalent to that of the EU. 
Even so, additional contractual measures recommended by the EDPB can 
create enhanced obligations that may be used to help establish protections 
that are essentially equivalent to those of the EU.  Part II.B.4.a examines 
potential transparency obligations.260  Part II.B.4.b analyzes potential 
obligations for the importers to take specific actions261 or use specific 
technical measures.262  Then, Part II.B.4.c considers recommendations that 
may empower data subjects to exercise rights to redress.263 
a.  Transparency Obligations 
The EDPB recommends several potential contractual terms that would 
require importers to disclose to exporters, based on their best efforts, the 
public authorities’ access to data.264  Such proactive disclosure would help 
the exporter with its task of assessing the level of protection in the third-party 
country.265 
The information to be disclosed could include the laws and regulations of 
the third-party country that would permit public authorities’ access and 
define the scope of that access.266  These terms could also require importers 
to disclose any and all requests that they may have previously received from 
public authorities seeking access to the relevant data and to disclose how they 
complied.267  In addition, the exporter may seek to include clauses where the 
importer certifies it has not deliberately created “back doors” that could be 
used by the public authorities to access data and that the law does not require 
them to create any mechanisms that would facilitate such access for the 
public authorities.268  These additional contractual protections, which limit 
the risk of U.S. public authorities that actually acquire the personal data, may 
satisfy the essentially equivalent protection requirement of the GDPR.269 
Unlike FISA Section 702, EO 12333 does not have the authority to compel 
companies involved in cross-border data transfers to provide U.S. public 
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authorities with that data.270  Instead, cooperation by any private company 
under the executive order is purely voluntary.271  Therefore, U.S. companies 
can make contractual promises about how they will or will not assist the U.S. 
government with surveillance.272  Promising not to assist under EO 12333 
could provide some assurance to the EU party of enhanced data protection. 
FISA Section 702, however, does provide some authority to compel a U.S. 
company’s cooperation.273  However, even that authority may be limited by 
contractual assurances.  First, not all data operators are eligible to receive 
such a directive from the U.S. government compelling disclosure of the 
relevant personal data; only electronic communication service providers can 
receive such a command.274  Therefore, many U.S. data importers could 
provide contractual assurances to the EU exporter of their ineligibility and 
provide assurances that any such directive would be fought to the fullest 
extent possible.275 
If an importer is an electronic communication service provider, it may still 
achieve essentially equivalent protection by making assurances that it has 
never been issued such a directive (as appears to be the case for the majority 
of firms)276 and that even if such a directive is issued, it will use any and all 
available judicial mechanisms to fight that directive.277  Further, if it has 
complied with a directive, the importer could promise to include the number 
and volume of affected users in transparency reports that can be made 
available to the EU firm.  The EU firm could then compare that information 
to the total volume of users’ data it exports, enabling it to make an informed 
risk assessment that could justify the continued transfers.278 
Alternatively, rather than relying on the importers’ assurances, exporters 
may seek access to the importers’ processing logs to determine for 
themselves if any data has been disclosed to public authorities.279  Such 
audits were already permitted under the earlier SCCs between controllers and 
processors280 or could be executed via alternative Article 46 mechanisms like 
certification or a code of conduct.281 
The EDPB’s final transparency recommendation is a contractual measure 
that establishes a “warrant canary.”282  This term would commit the importer 
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to publishing regularly (perhaps at least daily) a “cryptographically signed 
message” to the exporter that, as of that date and time, the importer has not 
received any request or order for protected data.283  Under such a scheme, 
the absence of this message could indicate to the exporter that the situation 
has changed.284  In order for this to be effective for transfers to the United 
States, the critical question is whether FISA’s prohibition on disclosure 
would apply such “passive notification.”285  It is not clear whether such an 
action would constitute improper disclosure under Section 702. 
No matter what transparency clauses may or may not be effective for 
transfers to the United States, it is likely necessary that they also include 
obligations for importers to take certain actions with respect to protecting the 
transferred data. 
b.  The Obligation to Take Specific Actions 
In addition to providing mechanisms for importers to disclose any access 
public authorities have gained, the parties could institute contractual 
measures to ensure actions on the part of the importer.  Should the parties 
find technical measures are warranted,286 the contract should indicate which 
measures are required for the transfers to take place287 so that both parties 
commit to the supplemental measure.288  In the event that an importer in the 
United States is eventually served with an order to disclose data to the public 
authorities, the importer may commit to challenge complying with the order 
to the best of its ability.289 
C.  Addressing Individual Redress in the United States 
While the EDPB and private industry recommend and utilize what they 
believe are permissible supplemental measures that limit the accessibility of 
one’s data to what is necessary and proportionate as required under EU law, 
the second prong of the CJEU’s reason for finding inadequacy—the lack of 
individual redress before an independent body—must also be addressed.  
This part assesses two main avenues that have been proposed to remedy that 
deficiency.  Part II.C.1 briefly examines the EDPB’s proposed private 
contractual solutions meant to enable the individual to exercise his or her 
rights.  Part II.C.2 examines a proposal to make a moderate modification to 
FISA to provide a mechanism for individual redress before an independent 
judiciary. 
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1.  Empowering Data Subjects to Exercise Rights 
In addition to the supplemental measures explored in Part II.B, which may 
be employed to mitigate the risk of public authorities gaining access to 
subjects’ data,290 the EDPB’s final recommendations from June 2021 include 
measures that may assist the data subjects in exercising their rights to 
redress.291  These measures include obligations for the importer and/or 
exporter to notify the data subject when public authorities of a third-party 
country request or order access to their data or when the importer can no 
longer comply with the contractual commitments protecting the data for 
whatever reason.292  They also include committing to assist the data subject 
in their exercise of their rights in the third-party country, so long as the 
country provides for redress.293  The effectiveness of both of these measures 
depends on the rights to redress in the third-party country and the importer’s 
ability to disclose the request or order in the first place.294 
2.  Statutory Change to Enable Redress 
In Schrems II, the CJEU noted that the relevant U.S. surveillance programs 
conducted under Section 702 of FISA and EO 12333 do not allow the 
subjects of the surveillance meaningful or actionable redress before “an 
independent and impartial court.”295  Similar reasoning was given as part of 
why Schrems I invalidated the earlier Safe Harbor Framework296 and why 
the ombudsperson mechanism was developed as part of the Privacy 
Shield.297  However, the CJEU observed that the ombudsperson, as under 
secretary of state, was part of the executive branch, not independent from it, 
and could not take actions to bind the intelligence community.298 
To adequately address what the CJEU perceives as deficiencies in judicial 
redress, some commentators argue that the United States will have to address 
two dimensions:  (1) legitimate fact-finding concerning classified 
surveillance activity in order to ensure protection of individuals’ rights, and 
(2) the ability to appeal to an independent judicial body that can remedy any 
potential violation.299 
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Factual inquiries may be appropriate for administrative groups so long as 
they are sufficiently independent.  Professors Kenneth Propp and Peter Swire 
note that enabling privacy and civil liberties officers (PCLOs) that already 
exist within the intelligence community to conduct the fact-finding inquiry 
may be viable.300  PCLOs already have the statutory charge to investigate 
possible violations of privacy and civil liberties and also already have access 
to relevant Top Secret and classified databases.301  Alternatively, the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), a small independent federal 
agency, could be empowered to conduct the necessary fact-finding duties.302 
Professors Propp and Swire argue that there are a number of advantages of 
PCLOs which may speak to their competency to take on expanded 
fact-finding duties.303  PCLOs are competent to assess how agencies handle 
data because they are responsible for performing “Privacy Impact 
Assessments” of any new surveillance systems that an intelligence agency 
wishes to implement and are also responsible for issuing regular reports 
concerning the intelligence agency’s activities.304  Structurally, PCLOs 
report directly to senior officials, which may be helpful should they 
encounter problems in the course of conducting an investigation.305  Lastly, 
PCLOs have existing staff and resources that are likely able to accommodate 
any new investigative responsibilities, such as responding to complaints from 
the EU.306 
While PCLOs may be most practically equipped to assume factual inquiry 
duties because they are part of the intelligence agencies themselves, another 
commentator notes that they may not satisfy the independence requirement 
outlined by the CJEU.307  Meanwhile, the PCLOB studied Section 702 of 
FISA and EO 12333 in the past six years and the EU recognizes and respects 
the PCLOB’s independent voice on these subjects.308  And like the PCLOs, 
the PCLOB has access to classified and Top Secret resources necessary for 
it to conduct adequate factual investigations.309 
However, enabling the PCLOB with this expanded responsibility poses 
logistical challenges based on its current structure and resources.  Because 
its statutory mandate currently only relates to oversight and policy at the 
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program level, expansion into investigatory tasks would require a statutory 
update, which in turn requires congressional action.  Conversely, any 
expansion of PCLO investigatory duties could be done based on 
administrative direction.310  In addition, the existing scope of the PCLOB’s 
mandate is limited to antiterrorism; therefore, Congress would also have to 
agree to expand that scope to include counterintelligence and national 
security more broadly for the PCLOB to be able to conduct effective 
fact-finding.311  Lastly, to properly empower the PCLOB, Congress would 
have to not only expand its statutory mandate but also support the body with 
proper resources and staffing, including maintaining a staffed board.312 
Whichever administrative body assumes the role of fact-finder, Professors 
Propp and Swire observe, the results shared with the complainant will likely 
be similar to those that the ombudsperson would also share—that there was 
no violation of the law or that any violation has been corrected.313  The 
agency decision could then be appealed to an Article III judge for 
independent judicial review.314  The FISC would be capable of the task 
because it is comprised of Article III judges who have experience handling 
foreign intelligence and U.S. surveillance matters.315 
Structuring the complainant’s request like a Freedom of Information 
Act316 (FOIA) request could solve the potential standing issues317 the CJEU 
highlighted in Schrems II.318  Under FOIA, an individual can request 
information or documents from an agency without having to demonstrate any 
“injury.”319  The receiving agency is then required to conduct an 
investigation and either provide the information or explain why it will not 
supply the documents.320  The requesting individual could appeal that agency 
decision to a federal court to assess the agency’s investigation and can order 
changes to the outcome should there be a mistake.321 
In this context, when an individual seeks redress suspecting their data has 
been improperly used as part of national security, the FISC could review the 
administrative body’s factual investigation to ensure the agency met its 
statutory requirements and could issue orders to correct or delete data or 
demand additional fact-finding if necessary.322  This sort of review of agency 
action or decision-making is common under the Administrative Procedure 
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Act323 (APA).  Finally, standing for the individual is established in this 
context because the “case or controversy” is the review of the agency action 
and whether the agency has complied with the statutory duties on behalf of 
the complaining individual.324 
III.  A HYBRID SOLUTION INVOLVING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 
In an ideal world, the best solution to the current uncertainty surrounding 
EU-U.S. cross-border data transfers might center on a new international 
agreement—a “Privacy Shield 2.0”—that includes updates to EU data 
protection mandates and addresses the CJEU’s objections to U.S. 
surveillance law.  Absent that highly unlikely scenario, companies and 
entities continue to assess the adequacy of the various proposals discussed in 
Part II to determine which, if any, can be utilized to satisfy the strict 
conditions required by the EU.325 
This part argues that the most effective solution for addressing the different 
deficiencies articulated in Schrems II is to adopt a hybrid of multiple 
private-law solutions discussed in Part II.B, along with manageable 
public-law updates discussed in Part II.C.  Part III.A addresses why some of 
the solutions from Part II are insufficient on their own.  Part III.B explains 
why the combination of encryption and updated SCCs can mitigate the risk 
of the U.S. public authorities improperly obtaining EU subjects’ data.  Then, 
Part III.C endorses parts of Professors Propp and Swire’s proposal to afford 
individuals an avenue to independent redress as the best solution, not only to 
fix the redress deficiency but also to meaningfully strengthen oversight of 
U.S. surveillance authorities—thereby helping to establish essentially 
equivalent protection. 
A.  The Ineffectiveness of Some Proposed Recommendations 
Article 49 derogations emerged in the immediate aftermath of Schrems II 
as a possible solution to the problem of inadequacy, perhaps in part due to 
the CJEU’s acknowledgment that the article could suffice.326  However, in 
the EDPB’s recommendations to exporters about supplemental measures, the 
board confirmed that the derogations under Article 49, including consent, 
have “an exceptional nature”327 and “must be interpreted restrictively and 
mainly relate to processing activities that are occasional and 
non-repetitive.”328  Therefore, in light of the EDPB’s subsequent guidance, 
which reiterates the “strict conditions” transfers must meet under any of the 
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Article 49 derogations, it is unlikely to be the mechanism on which most 
companies and transfers can rely for adequacy.329 
The same EDPB recommendations emphasize technical measures, but 
they are unlikely to provide the solution without more.330  Not only are the 
outlined parameters for considering encryption to be adequate protection 
very strict,331 there is also no redress for the data subjects in the United States 
if public authorities do access personal data despite the state-of-the-art 
technical measures the exporters and importers employ.332  The importer and 
exporter may then be exposed to liability for failing to create adequate 
protections.  Considering the uncertainty in the space, companies should 
conduct thorough assessments of the law and of the practices of public 
authorities toward their particular transfers and then combine technical 
measures with additional private-law options.333 
Many of the suggested contractual promises to inform the exporter and 
data subject of public authority access are promising, but in the context of 
U.S. importers, however, these recommended provisions may be 
impractical—particularly for those electronic communications service 
providers that are subject to FISA Section 702, which prohibits disclosure of 
any production orders they may receive for the data.334  In that circumstance, 
the importer may be able to specify which parts of the exporter’s inquiry they 
are legally prohibited from disclosing.335  But ultimately, if the legislation in 
the third-party country prevents such disclosure (as FISA Section 702 does 
in the United States),336 then the importer will be unable to comply with the 
above contractual commitments and will thus fail to provide essentially 
equivalent protection.337 
The contractual measures that impose an obligation to fight orders from 
public authorities to provide data would only be effective according to the 
EDPB’s recommendation if the public authority’s access to the data is 
suspended while the challenge takes place.338  Additionally, the importer 
would have to be permitted to document the actions it takes to demonstrate 
to the exporter that it has fulfilled its commitment.339  This is likely 
implausible given FISA’s current disclosure restrictions.340 
Of course, a provider making promises related to Section 702 of FISA may 
still ultimately be compelled to provide U.S. intelligence authorities with the 
information because this order is likely legal in the United States.341  In such 
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a scenario, the U.S.-based importer should inform the exporter of its inability 
to further comply with the terms; this notification will permit the exporter to 
cease further data transfers and terminate the contract.342  This scenario is 
already protected under the existing SCCs and does not require supplemental 
terms.343 
Importantly, the fact that such an exit strategy is provided for in the 
existing SCCs suggests that exporters and importers need not guarantee 
absolute security.344  By providing an “out” for when parties cannot comply, 
the SCCs—the validity of which was affirmed by the court in Schrems II—
imply a certain tolerance of risk, so long as transfers can be suspended once 
compliance is no longer feasible.345  So, while the EDPB’s recommendations 
suggest a primarily rights-based approach, there are elements of it that utilize 
a risk-based approach where the risk is properly assessed by the data exporter 
and importer on a case-by-case basis,346 which could be consistent with 
GDPR compliance.347 
B.  Solving Proportionality with Private Covenants 
The most effective and immediate way for companies to continue to 
transfer data from the EU to the United States is to adopt measures the 
companies themselves can take to mitigate the risk of sacrificing the data 
protections required under the GDPR.  A combination of state-of-the-art 
encryption and enhanced supplemental contractual clauses can provide an 
adequate level of protection for EU data subjects that is “essentially 
equivalent” to that of the EU.348 
As discussed in Part II.B.1, technical enhancements can provide the 
required level of legal protection under certain circumstances.349  The final 
direction from the EDPB explains that if data is encrypted prior to being 
transferred and the U.S. importer does not have the decryption key, then the 
encryption is considered an effective supplementary measure.350  In that 
scenario, even if public authorities obtain the data in transit or from the 
importer directly under Section 702, the data will be useless because the 
agency will not be able to match it to an EU data subject.351  So, even if the 
public authority technically obtains encrypted or pseudonymized data, the 
EDPB will still characterize the EU data as subject to protection so long as 
the public authority lacks the capacity to decrypt the data or reidentify the 
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subject.352  At a minimum, companies should endeavor to adopt any and all 
encryption methods that satisfy these criteria.353 
However, technical measures alone will not be enough in some cases.354  
For example, whenever the importer requires decrypted data for processing, 
that data may be vulnerable under Section 702, or it could be intercepted in 
transit via EO 12333.355  Therefore, additional binding protections should be 
addressed in contracts prior to transfers.356  Such clauses should first clearly 
articulate the encryption tools employed to prevent or minimize actual 
access, as discussed above.357  But these clauses should also include 
transparency measures and an obligation to take specific actions that are 
consistent with what is permissible under U.S. surveillance law.358 
These enhanced supplemental contractual clauses should begin with those 
that the EDPB has recommended.359  They should clearly identify how the 
importers and the data may be subject to the different aspects of U.S. 
surveillance law.360  For example, Section 702 of FISA only applies to 
electronic communications service providers, so if the importer falls outside 
of that definition, the reach of Section 702 need not impact the assessment of 
the transfer.361 
More critically, the parties can include provisions that obligate the 
importers to take legal action (in addition to the technical encryption) to 
prevent public authority access whenever possible.362  These could include 
guaranteeing good faith efforts to challenge any orders consistent with U.S. 
law.363 
The problem, however, is that under some of the U.S. laws, such as Section 
702, when an importer receives an order from the U.S. public authority 
requesting the data, the importer is prohibited from disclosing that fact to 
others, including the data subjects or the exporters.364  This may be overcome 
with a “canary” provision, whereby the importer sets a regular and frequent 
notification confirming that it has not received any request.365  Should that 
notification fail to reach the exporter according to schedule, that exporter will 
be free to suspend data transfers and notify the data subjects if it believes the 
public authorities have accessed that data.366  This “negative notification” 
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does not actually disclose that an order has been received; thus, it should be 
permissible and not in conflict with Section 702’s prohibitions.367 
These additional obligations recommended by the EDPB, when combined, 
can effectively mitigate the risk of overbroad U.S. public authority access to 
EU subjects’ data, and they should be adopted immediately.368  Indeed they 
are also consistent with the CJEU’s rationale in Schrems II, which articulated 
that private parties can take supplemental measures to achieve essentially 
equivalent protections for EU data subjects.369  Technical protections, along 
with contractual obligations, can clear this legal hurdle and provide practical 
protections for EU data subjects.  They do not, however, remedy the lack of 
judicial redress that was the primary deficiency in Schrems II.370  An 
effective remedy would require some level of congressional involvement.371 
C.  Enabling Individual Redress While Strengthening Oversight 
Despite the EDPB’s recommendations and private parties’ best efforts, 
private law cannot solve the standing problem for subjects who wish to seek 
redress from the U.S. judicial system.372  Therefore, Congress should adopt 
the main components of Professors Propp and Swire’s proposal373 for two 
reasons:  (1) the proposal is a reasonable and logical adjustment that remedies 
a consistent deficiency with regard to redress, and (2) the proposal is an 
opportunity to actually strengthen effective oversight of surveillance 
programs in the United States.  Such a result not only benefits the pragmatic 
needs of entities that wish to engage in cross-border data transfers between 
the EU and United States but also strengthens the state of American 
democracy.374 
Professors Propp and Swire propose two potential groups that could be 
appropriate for the task:  fact-finder PCLOs and the PCLOB.375  While 
PCLOs may be most readily equipped to assume factual inquiry duties 
because of their current role and work at the agencies,376 the PCLOB’s 
separation from the intelligence agencies makes it more likely to qualify as 
an independent and effective fact-finder consistent with the CJEU’s 
assessment of the requirements under the Charter.377  Ultimately, enabling 
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the PCLOB to assume the fact-finding role is the superior choice because the 
board’s entire mission can be focused on oversight, and it does not suffer 
from conflicting interests by being a part of the intelligence agency it is meant 
to monitor.378  Therefore, to simply, yet effectively, remedy the redress 
problem, Congress must take moderate statutory action to update the scope 
of the PCLOB’s role, duties, and resources.379 
Neither of these bodies would sufficiently address the redress problem on 
its own, however, as both are still within the executive branch.380  Professors 
Propp and Swire’s proposal effectively addresses this issue by subjecting to 
review by an Article III judge the results of any fact-finding done as part of 
agency decision-making; this judicial review is similar to that of any 
administrative agency decision-making review.381  While the proposed 
review would be a new task for the FISC, judges on this court are better suited 
for it than traditional Article III judges because of their expertise in U.S. 
surveillance law and demonstrated record of effective oversight of Section 
702.382 
Professors Propp and Swire realize that, due to the classified nature of the 
administrative finding, there may not be an effective way for the complainant 
to determine whether an appeal to the judiciary is warranted.383  Therefore, 
an automatic appeal to the FISC could work to ensure effective judicial 
oversight.384  The natural concern, then, would be overburdening the FISC 
by permitting a flood of complaints.385  However, that need not be the case 
if Congress considers an effective balance when it makes its statutory 
updates.386  Also, Professors Propp and Swire highlight that this is not a new 
problem; based on prior international agreements with Europe like the 
Privacy Shield and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the “actual 
number of complaints would likely be manageable.”387 
The other benefit of this proposed remedy to redress is seen during the 
appeal to the FISC.  The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015388 established a role 
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for amici curiae who can brief the FISC on “legal arguments that advance the 
protection of individual privacy and civil liberties.”389  In this capacity, the 
amici would also advance the interests of the complainant, allowing the FISC 
judge to receive complete adversarial briefings, thus further enhancing the 
judicial oversight.390 
Finally, the proposed expansion of redress should be made available to 
U.S. persons in addition to those making complaints from the EU.391  The 
Snowden revelations showed that these surveillance programs also impacted 
U.S. persons.392  While reform has taken place since the public learned of the 
mass collection programs in 2013, there is value in allowing a limited avenue 
of redress for U.S. persons to ensure that oversight keeps the intelligence 
community in check.393  This would not upend the standing requirements, 
but it would merely empower stronger and more effective independent 
oversight of the intelligence community, both at the agencies and in the 
judiciary.394  This proposal for redress seems to require the implementation 
of more government action, but it might provide the meaningful adjustment 
that institutes an opportunity for independent redress that, according to the 
CJEU, was critically missing from the Privacy Shield.395 
CONCLUSION 
In Schrems II, the CJEU confirmed that it will protect the fundamental 
privacy and data protection rights of EU subjects when subjects’ data is 
transferred out of the EU.  That position conflicts with the current scope of 
data collection conducted in accordance with U.S. surveillance law.  To 
resolve this conflict, private entities should do everything they can to 
reasonably protect EU personal data that is imported into the United States.  
In addition, the U.S. government must also make minor adjustments to 
improve and expand the independent oversight of the intelligence 
community. 
Private actors should adopt supplemental measures recommended by the 
EDPB, such as technical encryption and supplemental contract terms that 
provide more assurances about the steps they take to protect data from U.S. 
intelligence.  These measures are consistent with the CJEU’s assertion that 
supplemental measures may achieve essentially equivalent protection.  
However, if with the assurances, U.S. public authorities still access that data, 
the CJEU has been clear that there needs to be some properly independent 
avenue of redress for the data subject.  Expanding the purview of the FISC 
and empowering the PCLOB to perform independent factual investigations 
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are reasonable and manageable solutions that can enhance data protection 
and oversight without opening the entire judiciary to a flood of claims. 
